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Introduction
Every country encounters obstacles 
when trying to increase their tax revenues 
and this can be made more difficult when 
some companies try to avoid paying tax (Tsa-
kumis, Curatola, and Porcano, 2007). This re-
search extends the work done by Salihu, An-
nuar, and Obid (2015). Salihu, Annuar, and 
Obid (2015) suggested that the relationship 
between the interests of  investors and tax 
avoidance by multinational companies in Ma-
laysia remains unclear, as it does not consider 
the environmental or state conditions. These 
two factors influence the level of  tax avoid-
ance. This study examines the differences in 
tax avoidance levels between multinational 
companies and national companies operating 
in the same country. This study further exam-
ines the differences in corporate behaviour 
as a result of  the different legal systems and 
investor protection levels between countries. 
Moreover, this study investigates the con-
fusing results of  previous studies by con-
ducting this study in an international setting.
This research is relevant because it has 
new ideas about the phenomenon of  tax 
avoidance from an international perspec-
tive. Tax avoidance is considered to be a 
double-edged sword. Companies perform 
tax avoidance to regulate the fluctuations 
in their cash inflows (Shin and Woo, 2018). 
Tax avoidance increases corporate liquid-
ity, which creates growth opportunities. 
Likewise, multinational companies choose 
to invest in countries with flexible taxation 
rules (Blonigen and Davies, 2002; Hong and 
Smart, 2010; Egger, Merlo, and Wamser, 
2014). This study proposes three fresh argu-
ments. First, multinational companies tend to 
avoid taxes. Sikka and Willmott (2010) show 
that multinational companies can easily avoid 
taxes by utilising transfer pricing in their 
subsidiary and parent relationships, which 
typically exist in developed and developing 
countries. Multinational companies usually 
perform tax avoidance based on the under-
standing that there is no long-term conse-
quence or effect on their reputations (Akhtar 
et al., 2017). Therefore, this study argues that 
multinational companies tend to take tax 
avoidance measures more frequently, in com-
parison with national firms, because multi-
national companies aim to maintain capital. 
From another side, the existence of  media 
re-engineering business activities supports 
the behaviour of  multinational companies. 
Second, this study posits the concept 
of  the dividend catering theory, which is 
about the level of  investor protection and a 
country’s legal system. The dividend cater-
ing theory formulates that managers strive 
to always meet investors’ demands by pay-
ing dividends to maximise the company's 
stock price (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Li and 
Zhao, 2008). Tax avoidance is performed by 
corporate managers to gain greater corpo-
rate liquidity, so that the company can pay 
dividends. This study argues that a country’s 
environment strongly influences the actions 
underlying this dividend catering theory. In 
countries with a high level of  investor pro-
tection, corporate CEOs bond with investors 
at a high level. Thus the CEOs must main-
tain high profit levels and distribute large 
dividends to the investors. This process then 
requires the CEOs to perform tax avoidance.
Third, this study includes the contingen-
cy of  the legal and the country environment 
that both influence companies’ decisions to 
perform tax avoidance. La Porta et al., (1998) 
suggested that common law countries have 
higher levels of  protection against creditors 
and investors in comparison to code law 
countries. Meanwhile, the legal and country 
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environments indicate there are different 
levels of  protection between countries. This 
difference in the levels of  country protection 
affects corporate CEOs decisions to avoid 
taxes. The legal and country environments 
that protect investors usually give companies 
the freedom to avoid taxes. The reason is that 
company CEOs have to maintain capital (cap-
ital maintenance concepts). Thus, they tend to 
provide an adequate return for their investors 
through good tax planning. This policy agrees 
with the political cost hypothesis and the tax 
hypothesis of  Watts and Zimmerman (1978).
This study refers to several previous 
studies and their research constructs’ mea-
surements. The parameters used to assess the 
interests of  foreign investors include foreign 
direct investment (FDI)(Salihu, Annuar, and 
Obid, 2015; Schwarz, 2009; Blonigen and 
Davies, 2002). FDI is very beneficial for in-
creasing investment volumes and efficiency, 
resulting in competition among countries’ 
governments to attract foreign investors (Vua 
and Noy, 2009; Li and Liu, 2005; Hong and 
Smart, 2010). This study uses tax avoidance 
measurements based on four proxies: ac-
counting effective tax rate (ETR accounting), 
long-term cash effective tax rate (long-term 
cash ETR), income tax rate ratio in operat-
ing cash flow and tax ratio paid on cash flow 
operations (Salihu, Annuar, and Obid, 2015). 
This study includes developed and develop-
ing countries that embrace common law and 
code law systems, accompanied by the level 
of  investor protection and the legal environ-
ment. The research period is from 2009 to 
2016. The countries used in this study each 
represent the level of  investor protection ob-
tained from World Bank data in 2016. The re-
sult suggests that firms operating in countries 
with high levels of  investor protection, which 
also have a common law system, will perform 
higher tax avoidance. However, they usually 
have higher company growth in comparison 
to the others. As a consequence, this study sug-
gests countries create more flexible taxation 
policies to enable greater company growth.
The structure of  this study is as fol-
lows: Chapter 2 discusses the previous lit-
erature and theoretical basis. Chapter 3 dis-
cusses the research methodology. Chapter 
4 discusses the results of  the study. Chap-
ter 5 discusses the conclusions, limita-
tions and development of  future research.
Theoretical Background and 
Hypotheses Development
Positive Accounting Theory
There are four hypotheses proposed 
by the positive accounting theory. How-
ever, this study focuses on only two of  
them: the political cost and tax hypotheses.
Political Cost Hypothesis
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) con-
structed the political cost hypothesis, sug-
gesting that companies lobby governments 
when legal or accounting standards reduce 
their profits. The companies bears contract 
costs because they perform political process-
es, such as the costs incurred to protect them 
from and to avoid government regulations 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) explained that agents (man-
agers) would not act to maximise the interests 
of  the principals (investors). When manag-
ers act it affects their bonding costs. Mean-
while, the political costs align with the size 
hypothesis, which proposes that the more the 
big sized firms spend, the higher their polit-
ical costs are. It means that big companies 
tend to lower their profits (Watts and Zim-
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merman, 1978, 1990). This research posits 
to what Watts and Zimmerman (1978) sug-
gested. However, the agency relationship is 
between companies and governments. This 
study infers that companies do not attempt 
to bond with governments as the principals. 
Tax Hypothesis
A company's management makes dis-
cretionary policies to select accounting pro-
cedures that could increase or decrease its 
tax payment (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
Management make efforts to maximise the 
company’s book value, but this can impact on 
the corporate earnings. Thus, it also means 
that earnings affect the company's tax poli-
cy (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978); (1990) argued that if  a 
company attempts to manipulate the tax rules 
so it pays less tax, it can earn higher profits. 
This study takes into account the logical rea-
sonings of  Watts and Zimmerman (1978); 
(1990). Companies maximise their profits, 
part of  which is distributed to their investors. 
However, this is a contingency perspective 
because the companies’ achievement pro-
cess depended on how the could get quickly.
Tax Avoidance
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) 
defined tax avoidance as an increase in cash 
effectiveness through long-term tax rate re-
ductions. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) de-
veloped the definition of  tax avoidance from 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) and 
defined the widespread avoidance of  taxes 
as the actual tax deductions that companies 
should pay. The bonus-compensation factor 
encourages managers to be more aggres-
sive and increase corporate value through 
tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006). Kim and Zhang (2016) explained 
that where low legal compliance exists, the 
fines for law violations are relatively low 
and the market demand for financial trans-
parency is quite low, causing companies 
to be more aggressive in avoiding taxes.
Braga (2017) showed that the avoidance 
level during the period when IFRS was ad-
opted increased managements’ discretion 
to encourage tax avoidance. Atwood et al., 
(2012) suggested that companies performed 
tax avoidance because of  various factors, 
such as company-specific factors (firm size, 
leverage, operating costs, firm performance, 
multinational corporation operations) as 
well as factors across countries which can 
affect the tax avoidance of  firms, such as 
tax rates, profit volatility, and institutional 
factors. Morita (2015) stated that compa-
nies that make prepaid tax payments have a 
lower level of  tax deviation. This study in-
tends to expand the inter-state factor that 
influences companies’ tax avoidance, name-
ly the contingency of  the legal environ-
ment and the level of  investor protection.
Tax Avoidance in Multinational 
Companies Versus National Compa-
nies
Taxation policies in a country can increase 
foreign investment, but many countries often 
use them to constrain multinational compa-
nies from conducting tax planning (Blonigen 
and Davies, 2002; Hong and Smart, 2010). 
Taylor and Richardson (2012) researched 
companies operating in Australia and found 
that the practices of  transfer pricing, capi-
talisation and profit-refining practices were 
all closely linked to tax avoidance practices. 
Salihu, Annuar, and Obid (2015) conducted 
a study in Malaysia, as a developing country, 
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to show that tax avoidance rates by multina-
tional corporations are closely related to the 
level of  foreign interest reflected by FDI.
Hong and Smart (2010) further ex-
plained that there is a dilemma with foreign 
investment by multinational corporations, 
especially when a country sets its tax rates 
for them. When a country sets too high a tax 
rate, it will increase firms’ tax planning but 
decrease the foreign investment from multi-
national companies. Otusanya (2011) found 
that multinational corporations in Nigeria 
sought to earn higher profits, but most of  
them undertook tax avoidance. Then, the 
Nigerian government intervened by issuing 
a regulation to overcome its top companies’ 
classes and leads professional institutions. 
In contrast, Rego (2003) and Atwood et al., 
(2012) found that domestic companies in the 
US reported higher effective tax rates than 
multinational ones classified as high-income 
companies. Most of  the previous literature in-
dicates that multinational companies tend to 
avoid paying tax more than the national ones 
do. The multinational companies usually con-
duct a transfer pricing strategy. This research 
also argues that multinational companies 
tend to avoid taxes by employing their trans-
fer pricing strategies. Therefore, this study 
formulates the first hypothesis as follows:
H1: Tax avoidance by multinational compa-
nies operating in a country will be high-
er than that of  the national companies.
Investor Protection and Contingency 
Level
Different countries experience different 
rates of  tax avoidance so it is still a puzzle that 
needs to be solved (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006). The level of  investor protection is the 
best proxy for showing the differences in the 
characteristics of  different countries (De-
Fond, Hung, and Trezevant, 2007). The result 
of  Haidar's (2009) study showed that the lev-
el of  investor protection becomes the distin-
guishing factor between countries. Countries 
with high levels of  investor protection will 
have higher country growth rates than coun-
tries with low investor protection levels. The 
level of  investor protection is always related 
to the protection gained from the implemen-
tation of  regulations and the law, so that if  
a country has a reasonable level of  investor 
protection, then the country's capital market 
will be strong (La Porta et al., 2000a). Larrain, 
Tapia, and Urzúa (2017) found that firms with 
high investor protection levels have higher 
productivity than those with weaker protec-
tion, resulting in higher profits for the firms 
with high levels of  investor protection. The 
level of  investor protection is a legal regime 
that acts as a contract filter and varies between 
countries (Bergman and Nicolaievsky, 2007).
Shin and Woo (2018) explained that 
companies which avoid tax will find that 
their investors demand higher returns, due 
to the risks associated with the quality of  
the financial statements. Baker and Wurgler 
(2004) suggested the dividend catering theory 
which has three main fundamentals: inves-
tors demand cash dividend payouts from the 
company, the fulfilment of  their investors’ 
desires influences the stock price, and the 
decision on cash dividend payments is based 
on short term and long term cost and ben-
efit considerations. Thus, based on the div-
idend catering theory, managers seek to pay 
dividends to the shareholders. The research 
of  Jun, Li, and Yugang (2017) and Baker 
and Wurgler (2004) suggested that managers 
have concerns about meeting the investors’ 
demands for cash dividends and found that 
the managers' would try to meet the inves-
tors’ expectations. However, the fulfilment of  
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the demands for dividend payments encour-
ages agency issues. Dividend policies affect 
a firm’s value and are closely related to their 
agency costs (Braouezec and Lehalle, 2010).
This study considers that multination-
al companies have agency problems with 
the governments of  the countries where the 
companies operate. The changes to their div-
idend policies are caused by changes in the 
taxation rules (Hanlon and Hoopes, 2014). 
The high level of  investor protection encour-
ages better resources allocations, so that the 
level of  investor protection is closely related 
to the distribution of  corporate profits to 
shareholders. High investor protection sup-
ports the distribution of  profits (La Porta et 
al., 2000b). Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) also 
suggested that countries with better inves-
tor protection levels encourage higher divi-
dend payouts. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2008) and Shin and Woo (2018) explained 
that firms operating in countries with low 
investor protection levels tend to hold cash 
and provide a low-profit distribution to their 
investors. However, in countries with high 
investor protection levels, the companies 
hold less cash. This study argues that mul-
tinational companies operating in countries 
with good investor protection levels have 
bonding more easily and readily with their 
investors, so that managers try to distribute 
more profits to the investors. This study takes 
into account that tax avoidance has a positive 
response, especially when the company do-
ing it has low profitability but must ensure a 
high dividend payment. Therefore, this study 
formulates the second hypothesis as follows:
H2: Tax avoidance by multinational compa-
nies operating in countries with high in-
vestor protection levels is greater than 
the avoidance of  companies operating 
in countries that offer less protection.
The contingency of  the Legal Environ-
ment
La Porta et al., (1998) explained that 
countries with a civil law legal environment 
or code law have weaker shareholder pro-
tection levels than countries with the com-
mon law code. Goyal and Muckley (2013) 
confirmed the results of  Harford, Mansi, 
and Maxwell (2008), Alzahrani and Lasfer 
(2012), and La Porta et al., (2000b). They 
indicated that firms in countries with high 
investor protection levels and with com-
mon law systems pay higher dividends.
La Porta et al., (1998), and Mahoney 
(2001) argue that the legal characteristics 
of  a country means it has different views to 
other countries; common law countries have 
stronger capital markets than code law ones 
do. This study highlights that companies op-
erating in common law countries show high 
levels of  growth, this is due to the availability 
of  high levels of  protection for property and 
contracts. Jaggi and Low (2000) found that 
corporate finance disclosure levels in coun-
tries with common law environments are 
higher than are found in code law countries. 
This research argues that companies operat-
ing in countries with high investor protection 
levels and under a common law legal sys-
tem will have a high growth rate. Moreover, 
these companies usually avoid paying more 
tax. This study infers that they could achieve 
higher growth rates because the countries 
they operate in gave them more opportu-
nities to manipulate their taxable profits. 
In other words, they can evade their taxes 
and use the money saved to increase their 
earnings. Furthermore, they can avoid pay-
ing tax because the countries’ legal environ-
ments support them. Therefore, this study 
constructs the third hypothesis as follows:
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H3: Tax avoidance by multinational com-
panies operating in countries with 
high levels of  investor protection and 
common law is higher than the avoid-
ance by companies operating in coun-
tries that do not have these things.
Research Method
Research Sample
This study selects its sample by cate-
gorising countries with high and low levels of  
investor protection. The categorisations are 
according to the level of  investor protection 
obtained from the World Bank data from 
2016. Moreover, this study also identified 
whether the country applied common law or 
code law — company data and tax avoidance 
information were derived from the Osiris – 
Bureau van Dijk Database. The level of  pro-
tection for investors was categorised as high 
if  the score was equal to or more than six. 
It was categorised as being low if  the score 
was less than six. This research collected data 
from 10 countries. The research period was 
from 2009 to 2016. The study used a purpo-
sive sampling method. It designed its criteria 
with the following steps. First, this study se-
lected and simultaneously identified national 
and multinational companies which issued fi-
nancial statements for the period from 2009 
to 2016. Second, it eliminated banking and 
financial companies. Third, it selected com-
panies reporting positive earnings during 
2009 to 2016. Finally, this study identified 
every company with foreign investors who 
owned at least 5.00% of  the company. Ta-
ble 1 describes the chosen countries’ inves-
tor protection levels and legal environments.
Research Variable
This research model extends Salihu, An-
nuar, and Obid (2015). This study used the 
tax avoidance level as a dependent variable. 
It measured the company tax avoidance rate 
(CTA rate) based on four proxies adopted 
from Salihu, Annuar, and Obid (2015). The 
first proxy was the accounting effective tax 
rate (ETR) or CTA1, measured by income 
tax expenses divided by pre-tax profits (Chen 
et al., 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 
2010). The second proxy was the long-term 
cash effective tax rate or CTA2, measured 
by the taxes paid for four years divided by 
the 4-year pre-tax profits (Chen et al., 2010; 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010). The 
third proxy was CTA3 which was measured 
by income tax expenses divided by operat-
ing cash flows (Lanis and Richardson, 2012). 
The fourth proxy, CTA4, was measured 
using the taxes paid divided by operating 
cash flows (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).
This study used four items as the inde-
pendent variables. The first independent vari-
Table 1. Countries’ Description




The Netherlands 5.7 Code Law
Indonesia 5.3 Code Law
China 4.3 Code Law
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able was foreign ownership. It reflected the 
foreign investment conducted by a company. 
This study measured foreign variables by us-
ing three proxies adopted from Salihu, Annu-
ar, and Obid (2015). The second independent 
variable was the firm operating level, which 
showed the tax avoidance of  multinational 
and national firms. This study employed a 
dummy variable that had a value of  “1” for 
a multinational corporation and “0” for a 
national company. This study defined multi-
national companies as companies that stand 
and operate in other countries, and have 
foreign investment in their equity accounts.
The third independent variable was the 
level of  investor protection offered by each 
Table 2. Operational Definitions 
Dependent Variable CTA = Corporarte 
Tax Avoidance
Using 4 proxies Accounting 
ETR (CTA1)




Tax paid for four years ÷ 
profit before tax for four 
years
CTA3 Income tax expense ÷ oper-
ational cash flow
CTA4 Tax paid ÷ operational cash 
flow
Independent Variable Foreign Ownership 
(FDI)
Using three proxies Foreign1 Stock proportion owned 
by foreign ÷ company total 
stock
Foreign2 Dichotomy variable where 
1 = company with foreign 
ownership at 5% and 0 = 
company with foreign own-
ership less than 5%.
Foreign3 The proportion of  foreign 








Dummy Variable Value 1 for a high level of  investor pro-
tection (≥ 6), value 0 for the low level of  
investor protection (< 6)
Law Environment 
(LAW)
Dummy Variable Value 1 for common law legal environment, 
value 0 for code law country
Control Variables Political Connec-
tion
Polcon Political connections are represented by 
government ownership as measured by the 
number of  shares held by government insti-
tutions and government-controlled entities 
÷ total share ownership of  the company.
Firm Size Fsize Log total asset.
Profit Profit ROA.
Leverage Lev Long-term debt ÷ total asset.
Capital Intensity 
(Capint)
Capint Fixed asset  ÷ total asset.
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country (ANTIDIR Index) as measured by a 
dummy variable with the value “1” for coun-
tries whose investor protection level is equal 
to and more than six, or “0” for those that are 
less than six. The fourth independent variable 
was the legal environment, which was also 
measured by a dummy variable. The value 
“1” was for the common law environment, 
while the value “0” was for code law states. 
This study used five control variables. The 
first one was political connections, measured 
by the number of  shares held by government 
institutions and government-controlled en-
tities divided by the total share ownership 
of  the company (Adhikari, Derashid, and 
Zhang, 2006). The other four control vari-
ables were firm size and leverage, adopted 
from Atwood et al., (2012) and Chen et al., 
(2014), along with profit and capital inten-
sity adopted from Chen et al., (2014). Table 
2 contains the operational definitions of  all 
the variables along with their formulations.
Statistical Analysis 
This study used cross-sectional data 
analysis. It used regression analysis by ordi-
nary least-squares (OLS). Because of  OLS, 
it performs BLUE (best-linearity unbiased 
error) standard. It controls the linearity by 
conducting normality, heteroscedastici-
ty, and multi-collinearity tests. Moreover, 
this study picked one out of  several meth-
ods until the requirements were fulfilled so 
that there were no unbiased errors for each 
test. This study examined each hypothesis 
using four different models. This research 
examined Hypothesis H1 using model 1, 
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CTAnit:  Tax avoidance by company i in year t.
n:  Type of  CTA measurement proxy from 1 to 4.





/ :  Consists of  foreign variables one, two, and three, 
which are tested separately.
Foreign1it: Foreign investors interest as measured by proxy 
one for company i in period   t.
Foreign2it:  Foreign investors interest as measured by proxy 
two for company i in period t.
Foreign3it:  Foreign investors interest as measured by proxy 
three for company i in period t.
Natlevelit:  Classification of  company i as multinational or 
national company in year t.
ANTIDIRit:  Investor protection index for company i in year t, 
low if  <6, high if  ≥ 6.
LAWit:  Dummy law environment, classified as common 
law or code law.
Polconit:  Political connections of  company i in year t.
Fsizeit:  Size of  company i in year t.
Profitit:  Profitability of  company i in year t.
Levit:  Leverage of  company i in year t.
Capintit:  Capital intensity of  company i in year t.
Statistical Results and Discus-
sions
The method of  sampling used purpo-
sive sampling. The total number of  compa-
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nies observed was 150 companies. This study 
used a cross-sectional analysis unit, so there 
were 1,050 firm-years available for observa-
tion. This research succeeded in collecting 
the final sample of  919 firm-years, which 
were used as the analysis unit. It analysed the 
CTA2 variable using 528 firm-years only. This 
was because this study avoids the year 2008 
as a firm-year due to the economic recession. 
The Foreign3 variable used 129 firm-years 
for its analysis since there were limited data 
to investigate. Table 3 contains the descrip-
tive statistics of  the independent and depen-
dent research variables. Table 4 contains the 
descriptive statistic of  the dummy variables. 
The average score of  CTA1 was 
0.63538. It meant that the companies from 
six countries have 63.538% of  their income 
estimated as their tax obligations. The aver-
age of  CTA2 was 0.13868. It indicated that 
13.868% of  the total expenses were paid to 
the tax office. The average of  CTA3 was 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
CTA1 919 0.140 2,274 0.63538 0.355300
CTA2 528 0.002 1,044 0.13868 0.148082
CTA3 919 0.033 8,760 0.83534 0.988252
CTA4 919 0.000 4,572 0.20638 0.425577
Foreign1 919 0.000 0.920 0.20865 0.186001
Foreign3 129 0.000 1,000 0.19877 0.211637
Polcon 918 0.000 0.850 0.14744 0.237541
Fsize 919 4,432 10,728 6.49311 1.148594
Profit 919 0.440 37,390 8.58714 5.402613
Lev 919 0.000 0.603 0.15001 0.124621
Capint 919 0.069 0.945 0.48817 0.208016
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables
Variable Information Frequency Percentage
Foreign 2
Foreign ownership < 5% 187 20.3
Foreign ownership ≥ 5% 732 79.7
Total 919 100
Law




National companies 336 36.6
Multinational companies 583 63.4
Total 919 100
ANTIDIR
Low level of  investor protection 211 23
High level of  investor protection 708 77
Total 919 100
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0.83534, which indicated that 83.534% of  a 
company’s operational cash was the compa-
ny’s tax expense. The average of  CTA4 was 
0.20638 and indicated that 20,638% of  a 
company’s operational cash were funds that 
were put aside for tax. The average of  the 
Foreign1 variable was 0.20865. It means that 
20.865% of  a company’s stock was owned by 
foreign companies. The Foreign2 variable was 
a dummy variable and its data were presented 
in the form of  a frequency. The Foreign2 vari-
able showed that 79.7% of  the companies 
analysed has at least 5% foreign ownership. 
Meanwhile, 20.3% of  the companies had less 
than 5% foreign ownership. The average of  
the Foreign3 variable was 0.19877, which in-
dicated that 19.877% was the proportion of  
the six countries’ foreign board of  directors.
The variable of  law was categorised into 
common law and code law. The proportion of  
companies operating in common law coun-
tries was 73.9% and the rest (26.1%), operated 
in code law countries. The Natlevel variable 
consisted of  multinational and national com-
panies. Of  the companies analysed, 63.4% 
were multinational companies and 36.6% 
national companies. The ANTIDIR variable 
was classified into countries with high or low 
levels of  investor protection. There were 
77% of  the companies operating in countries 
with a high level of  investor protection and 
the other 33% operated in countries with a 
low level of  investor protection. The aver-
age of  the policy variable was 0.14644, which 
showed that 14.744% of  the companies’ eq-
uity was owned by the governments of  six 
countries. The average profit was 8.58714. 
Meanwhile the leverage variable was 0.15001. 
It indicated that 15% of  the total assets of  
the companies were funded by long-term 
debt. The average of  the Capint variable was 
0.48817. The average variable was 6.49311.
This study met the standards for het-
eroscedasticity and multicollinearity. How-
ever, it did not meet the standard for the 
normality test. This study posits the cen-
tral limit theorem (CLT), which justifies the 
normality assumption. This study believes 
that the size of  the sample utilised in this 
study, which was more than 200, was suffi-
cient; therefore, the data were not consid-
ered normal, so that the normality assump-
tion could be neglected (Gujarati, 2003).
Tax Avoidance by Multinational 
Companies versus National Compa-
nies
This study analysed four dependent 
variables (CTA1, CTA2, CITA 2, CTA4), 
each one was regressed separately. Each de-
pendent variable had three measurements 
explained in each sub-model. Sub-model 
1A utilised Foreign1 as the control variable. 
Sub-model 1B used Foreign2 as the control 
variable and sub-model 1C used Foreign3 as 
the control variable. The Natlevel variable 
was the focus for the test of  the first hypoth-
esis. Although the Natlevel variable was the 
main focus, the Foreign1, Foreign2 and For-
eign3 variables show the metamorphosis of  
the Natlevel variable. If  the analysis shows 
an insignificant result for the Natlevel vari-
able (unable to read the Natlevel), then this 
study concludes with these variables. Table 5 
presents the examination result of  model 1.
The result of  the Natlevel variable was 
significant at the level of  1% in the CTA1 
model (sub-models 1A and 1B). The result 
of  CTA1 model sub-model1C showed that 
the Foreign3 variable was significant at the lev-
el of  5%. Besides that, in sub-Model 1B, the 
Foreign2 variable was significant at the level 
of  1%. The result showed that the first hy-
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Table 5. Statistical Results for Model 1
Model 1 - CTA1
1A 1B 1C
Β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig.
α 0.566 7,864 *** 0.561 7.84 *** 0.317 1,599  
CTAt-1 0.222 13,238 *** 0.221 13,256 *** 0.645 8,846 ***
Foreign1 0.004 0.068      
Foreign2   0.071 2,867 ***   
Foreign3     0.294 2,516 **
NatLevel 0.085 4,225 *** 0.078 3,909 *** 0.071 1,365  
PolCon -0.012 -0.227  -0.023 -0.456  0.04 0.29  
Size -0.012 -1,148  -0.017 -1,623  -0.018 -0.641  
Profit -0.018 -9,258 *** -0.018 -9,576 *** -0.015 -2,895 ***
Lev 0.503 5.12 *** 0.495 5,061 *** 0.442 1,839 *
Capint 0.043 0.763  0.034 0.611  -0.061 -0.426  
R2 0.363 0.369 0.578
Adj.-R2 0.357 0.363 0.550
F-Value              64,747 ***               66,359 *** 20,537 ***
Model 1 - CTA2
1A 1B 1C
Β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig.
α 0.045 3,731 *** 0.046 3.78 *** 0.06 3,133 ***
CTAt-1 0.92 77,608 *** 0.918 77,851 *** 0.832 47,686 ***
Foreign1 -0.011 -1,273      
Foreign2   0.004 1.01    
Foreign3     0.003 0.279  
NatLevel 0.005 1,464  0.003 1,013  0.003 0.566  
PolCon 0.035 3,898 *** 0.036 4,089 *** 0.043 3,084 ***
Size -0.003 -1,901 * -0.004 -2,168 ** -0.003 -1,137  
Profit -0.001 -2,538 ** -0.001 -2,778 *** -0.001 -2,404 **
Lev 0.042 2,766 *** 0.043 2,796 *** 0.02 0.866  
Capint -0.044 -4,572 *** -0.046 -4,806 *** -0.048 -3,259 ***
R2 0.944 0.944 0.967
Adj.-R2 0.943 0.943 0.965
F-Value 1,090.265 *** 1,088.933 ***                  439,187 ***
Model 1 - CTA3
1A 1B 1C
Β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig.
α 0.593 2,452 ** 0.622 2,573 *** -0.264 -0.439  
CTAt-1 0.228 7,209 *** 0.224 7,101 *** 0.729 4,994 ***
Foreign1 -0.272 -1.53      
Foreign2   -0.191 -2,285 **   
Foreign3     -0.281 -0.768  
NatLevel -0.038 -0.561  -0.038 -0.574  0.101 0.638  
PolCon -0.058 -0.335  -0.001 -0.006  -0.443 -1,045  
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Size 0.029 0.805  0.037 1,018  0.097 1,146  
Profit 0.003 0.478  0.004 0.594  -0.011 -0.707  
Lev 0.086 0.261  0.115 0.35  0.016 0.022  
Capint -0.17 -0.893  -0.172 -0.907  0.055 0.126  
R2 0.062 0.065 0.195
Adj.-R2 0.054 0.057 0.142
F-Value               7,551 ***               
7,934
***               
3,637
***
Model 1 - CTA4
1A 1B 1C
Β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig.
α 0.212 2,124 ** 0.207 2,076 ** -0.075 -0.632  
CTAt-1 0.173 6,525 *** 0.174 6,596 *** 0.45 5,139 ***
Foreign1 0.092 1,252      
Foreign2   -0.002 -0.05    
Foreign3     -0.013 -0.178  
NatLevel -0.042 -1,503  -0.035 -1,245  0.013 0.423  
PolCon 0.191 2.64 *** 0.182 2,516 ** -0.028 -0.331  
Size 0.021 1,429  0.024 1,563  0.04 2,376 **
Profit -0.001 -0.46  -0.001 -0.352  -0.002 -0.491  
Lev 0.077 0.568  0.075 0.552  -0.177 -1,239  
Capint -0.417 -5,191 *** -0.407 -5,076 *** -0.113 -1,265  
R2 0.139 0.137 0.316
Adj.-R2 0.131 0.13 0.271
F-Value 18,291 *** 18,064 *** 6,938 ***
Note: ***, **, * is significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
pothesis was supported (Ha1 supported) by 
using the various measurement models. The 
best model to test the first hypothesis was the 
CTA1 model. The Lev variable was positive 
and significant at the level 1% in sub-models 
1A and 1B. Meanwhile, sub-model 1C was 
also positive and significant at the level of  
10%. This finding is in line with the previ-
ous research done by Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2008). The Profit variable had a 
negative correlation and was significant to-
wards those three models at the level of  1%. 
It indicates that when a company’s profit is 
low, the company is likely to be more aggres-
sive regarding tax avoidance. It corresponds 
to the research of  Shin and Woo (2018). They 
argued that there is a positive response to-
wards tax avoidance by a company when the 
company is undergoing a decline in its profits.
Multinational companies have more 
significant opportunities for tax avoidance. 
They are usually supported by creating the 
special purpose vehicles used to transfer 
the price mechanism, the system of  mar-
ket capitalisation, and the ability of  profit 
smoothing (Taylor and Richardson, 2012). 
The transfer price mechanism can be a strat-
egy for the multinational firms’ tax planning. 
Multinational companies become the medi-
ators of  profit shifting towards their parent 
companies (Schwarz, 2009). The absence 
of  non-tax fees guaranteed by the multina-
tional companies contributes to tax avoid-
ance (Akhtar et al., 2017). This study found 
that national companies tend to be less ag-
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gressive regarding tax avoidance. They have 
a different focus in comparison with the 
multinational companies; they do not prior-
itise their investors. Consequently, national 
companies do not always intend to provide 
dividend payments or keep the profits they 
make. This result contradicts Rego (2003) 
and Atwood et al., (2012). They stated that 
the involvement of  multinational companies 
in tax avoidance is lower than national ones.
The Contingency of  Investor Protection 
Level
A separate examination of  each depen-
dent variable, along with the four measure-
ments was conducted. This study explained 
the statistical results for each measurement 
in the four sub-models. Table 6 shows the 
summary of  the test result for model 2. The 
Table 6. Statistical Results for Model 2
Model 2 - CTA Tipe 1 2A 2B 2C 2D
ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig.
α 0.65 7,149 *** 0.503 3,685 *** 0.164 0.568  0.556 6,267 ***
CTAt-1 0.229 13,506 *** 0.226 13.44 *** 0.658 9,103 *** 0.222 13,229 ***
Foreign1 -0.101 -0.9        
Foreign2   0.162 1,461      
Foreign3     0.274 1,314    
NatLevel       0.07 1,594  
ANTIDIR -0.047 -0.963  0.093 0.831  0.068 0.59  0 0.001  
Foreign1*ANTIDIR 0.201 1,589        
Foreign2*ANTIDIR   -0.08 -0.703      
Foreign3*ANTIDIR     0.121 0.475    
NatLevel*ANTIDIR       0.021 0.418  
PolCon -0.003 -0.048  -0.002 -0.037  0.083 0.58  -0.004 -0.064  
Size -0.015 -1,329  -0.018 -1,568  0.001 0.042  -0.011 -0.937  
Profit -0.018 -9,095 *** -0.019 -9,401 *** -0.015 -2,875 *** -0.018 -9,214 ***
Lev 0.496 4.99 *** 0.485 4,908 *** 0.375 1,505  0.502 5,093 ***
Capint 0.07 1,203  0.048 0.848  -0.049 -0.341  0.041 0.722  
R2 0.352 0.359 0.578 0.363
Adj.-R2 0.346 0.352 0.546 0.357
F-Value 54,897 *** 56,420 *** 18,084 *** 57,557 ***
Model 2 - CTA Tipe 2 2A 2B 2C 2D
ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig.
α 0.062 4,141 *** 0.038 1.94 * 0.115 4,059 *** 0.041 2,689 ***
CTAt-1 0.922 77,854 *** 0.919 77,508 *** 0.82 47,376 *** 0.917 76,245 ***
Foreign1 -0.05 -2,905 ***       
Foreign2   0.013 0.952      
Foreign3     -0.048 -2,399 **   
NatLevel       0.01 1,456  
ANTIDIR -0.017 -2,245 ** 0.009 0.652  -0.032 -2,829 *** 0.006 0.838  
Foreign1*ANTIDIR 0.053 2,779 ***       
Foreign2*ANTIDIR   -0.009 -0.634      
Foreign3*ANTIDIR     0.075 3.01 ***   
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NatLevel*ANTIDIR       -0.008 -1,021  
PolCon 0.028 2,896 *** 0.036 3,885 *** 0.036 2,603 *** 0.037 3,986 ***
Size -0.004 -2.05 ** -0.004 -2.01 ** -0.007 -2,237 ** -0.003 -1,803 *
Profit -0.001 -2,505 ** -0.001 -2,732 *** -0.001 -2,441 ** -0.001 -2,624 ***
Lev 0.041 2,652 *** 0.042 2,703 *** 0.036 1,546  0.042 2,725 ***
Capint -0.037 -3,734 *** -0.045 -4,698 *** -0.049 -3.46 *** -0.046 -4,828 ***
R2 0.945 0.944 0.969 0.944
Adj.-R2 0.944 0.943 0.967 0.943
F-Value 978,407 *** 964,899 *** 419,996 *** 966,150 ***
Model 2 - CTA Tipe 3 2A 2B 2C 2D
ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig. ß t-value Sig.
α 0.306 1,015  0.101 0.222  -0.606 -0.697  0.431 1,452  
CTAt-1 0.226 7,141 *** 0.222 7,022 *** 0.702 4,727 *** 0.227 7,166 ***
Foreign1 0.13 0.347       
Foreign2   0.161 0.433     
Foreign3     0.001 0.001   
NatLevel       -0.067 -0.453  
ANTIDIR 0.242 1,467  0.453 1,208  0.236 0.651  0.118 0.766  
Foreign1*ANTIDIR -0.484 -1,146       
Foreign2*ANTIDIR   -0.365 -0.959     
Foreign3*ANTIDIR     -0.317 -0.403   
NatLevel*ANTIDIR       0.018 0.111  
PolCon 0.053 0.273  0.04 0.214  -0.334 -0.757  0.05 0.272  
Size 0.044 1,151  0.053 1,384  0.134 1,262  0.038 1,008  
Profit 0.002 0.309  0.002 0.374  -0.012 -0.736  0.001 0.087  
Lev 0.075 0.226  0.091 0.275  -0.114 -0.15  0.071 0.216  
Capint -0.242 -1,239  -0.201 -1,056  0.069 0.157  -0.225 -1,171  
R2 0.064 0.067 0.195 0.062
Adj.-R2 0.055 0.058 0.134 0.052
F-Value 6,922 *** 7,244 *** 3,209 *** 6,621 ***
Model 2 - CTA Tipe 4 2A 2B 2C 2D
B t-value Sig. b t-value Sig. b t-value Sig. b t-value Sig.
α 0.208 1,663 * 0.158 0.836  -0.058 -0.332  0.249 2,032 **
CTAt-1 0.173 6,545 *** 0.174 6,576 *** 0.443 5,083 *** 0.174 6,562 ***
Foreign1 0.067 0.433     
Foreign2  0.058 0.379    
Foreign3    -0.045 -0.36   
NatLevel     -0.03 -0.487  
ANTIDIR -0.015 -0.222 0.04 0.255  -0.011 -0.153  -0.027 -0.423  
Foreign1*ANTIDIR -0.009 -0.052     
Foreign2*ANTIDIR  -0.073 -0.462    
Foreign3*ANTIDIR    0.059 0.386   
NatLevel*ANTIDIR     -0.009 -0.126  
PolCon 0.169 2,099 ** 0.153 1,985 ** -0.026 -0.294  0.161 2,099 **
Size 0.021 1,336 0.022 1,398  0.039 1,875 * 0.02 1,248  
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Profit -0.001 -0.333 0 -0.178  -0.001 -0.475  -0.001 -0.188  
Lev 0.08 0.585 0.081 0.589  -0.175 -1,177  0.08 0.585  
Capint -0.421 -5,127 *** -0.408 -5,062 *** -0.112 -1,248  -0.401 -4,969 ***
R2 0.137 0.136 0.316 0.138
Adj.-R2 0.128 0.128 0.265 0.129
F-Value 15,972 *** 15,929 *** 6,115 *** 16,118 ***
Note: ***, **, * is significant at 1%, 5%, 10%
examination of  Foreign1, Foreign2, Foreign3, 
and Natlevel variables was split due to mul-
ticollinearity. The result shows that CTA2 in 
sub-models 2A and 2C, the Foreign1, Foreign3 
and ANTIDIR variables had a negative cor-
relation and significance at the 5% level. The 
moderations of  the Foreign1*ANTIDIR and 
Foreign2*ANTIDIR variables show positive 
correlations and were significant at the level 
of  1%. The best model to predict the second 
hypothesis was the model CTA2 (sub-models 
of  2A and 2C). The result indicates that the 
second hypothesis was supported (Ha2 sup-
ported) by utilising the various measurements.
The Polcon (political connection) con-
trol variable showed a positive correlation 
and was significant at the level of  1%. The 
result is similar to the research done by Kim 
and Zhang (2016). This finding contradicts 
Salihu, Annuar, and Obid (2015). They found 
that there was a negative correlation between 
political connections and companies’ aggres-
siveness in their tax avoidance. The Lev vari-
able had a positive correlation and was sig-
nificant in the CTA2 model 2A sub-model, 
at the level of  1%. The other control vari-
ables –size and profit– had a negative cor-
relation and were significant at the level of  
5% towards both sub-models. The findings 
agree with the findings of  Rego (2003) and 
Atwood et al., (2012). They believed that the 
bigger the company was, the less aggressive 
they were in avoiding taxes. The result of  
the profit variable was similar to the result 
found by Shin and Woo (2018). The variable 
of  Capint had a negative correlation and was 
significant at the level of  1% in sub-models 
2A and 2C. This result showed that if  the 
capital intensity was low, the tax avoidance 
would be more aggressive. The Capint vari-
able was related to a depreciation budget 
which can affect the amount of  tax payable.
This study found that multinational 
companies, which were related to foreign 
investors and operating in countries with a 
high level of  investor protection, were more 
aggressive in avoiding taxes. The level of  
investor protection ensured the investors 
would receive an income. Harford, Mansi, 
and Maxwell (2008) stated that companies 
Table 7. Statistical Results for Model 3 
Model 3 - CTA Tipe 1
3A 3B 3C 3D
β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. Β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig.
α 0.524 4,941 *** 0.452 3,719 *** 0.164 0.568  0.501 4,554 ***
CTAt-1 0.227 13,397 *** 0.225 13,345 *** 0.658 9,103 *** 0.222 13,198 ***
Foreign1 -0.025 -0.241     
Foreign2  0.149 1,894 *    
Foreign3   0.274 1,314   
NatLevel     0.068 1,586  
LAW 0.101 1.41 0.126 1,482 $ $ $ 0.07 0.973  
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ANTIDIR -0.101 -1,509 -0.026 -0.367 0.068 0.59  -0.058 -0.864  
Foreign1*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
0.103 0.86     
Foreign2*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
 -0.076 -0.926    
Foreign3*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
  0.121 0.475   
NatLevel*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
    0.02 0.401  
PolCon -0.013 -0.225 -0.019 -0.326 0.083 0.58  -0.016 -0.275  
Size 0 0.019 -0.008 -0.583 0.001 0.042  -0.002 -0.159  
Profit -0.018 -9,012 *** -0.019 -9,411 *** -0.015 -2,875 *** -0.018 -9,184 ***
Lev 0.479 4,796 *** 0.476 4,793 *** 0.375 1,505  0.492 4,954 ***
Capint 0.061 1,057  0.05 0.883  -0.049 -0.341  0.042 0.736  
R2 0.353 0.353 0.578 0.364
Adj.-R2 0.346 0.353 0.546 0.357
F-Value               
49,570
***             
50,988
***              
18,084
***              
51,947
***
Model 3 - CTA Tipe 2
3A 3B 3C 3D
β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. Β t-value. Sig. β t-value Sig.
α 0.062 3,563 *** 0.045 2,284 ** 0.115 4,059 *** 0.044 2.36 **
CTAt-1 0.922 77,621 *** 0.919 77,331 *** 0.82 47,376 *** 0.917 75,759 ***
Foreign1 -0.045 -2,752 ***      
Foreign2  0.011 0.955     
Foreign3    -0.048 -2,399 **  
NatLevel      0.008 1,126  
LAW -0.009 -0.739 -0.001 -0.097  $ $ $ -0.002 -0.128  
ANTIDIR -0.008 -0.675 0.007 0.606  -0.032 -2,829 *** 0.005 0.474  
Foreign1*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
0.049 2,623 ***      
Foreign2*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
 -0.006 -0.533     
Foreign3*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
   0.075 3.01 ***  
NatLevel*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
     -0.005 -0.616  
PolCon 0.03 3,005 *** 0.037 3.86 *** 0.036 2,603 *** 0.037 3,934 ***
Size -0.004 -1,774 * -0.004 -1,912 ** -0.007 -2,237 ** -0.004 -1,537  
Profit -0.001 -2,403 ** -0.001 -2,777 *** -0.001 -2,441 ** -0.001 -2,619 ***
Lev 0.041 2.64 *** 0.043 2,735 *** 0.036 1,546  0.043 2.72 ***
Capint -0.038 -3,855 *** -0.045 -4,692 *** -0.049 -3.46 *** -0.046 -4,797 ***
R2 0.944 0.944 0.969 0.944
Adj.-R2 0.943 0.943 0.967 0.943
F-Value                
877,401
***              
866,844
***              
419,996
***               
866,879
***
Model 3 - CTA Tipe 3
3A 3B 3C 3D
β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. Β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig.
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α 0.036 0.102  -0.136 -0.336  -0.606 -0.697  0.137 0.373  
CTAt-1 0.223 7,052 *** 0.217 6,871 *** 0.702 4,727 *** 0.224 7,096 ***
Foreign1 0.142 0.405     
Foreign2  0.045 0.172    
Foreign3    0.001 0.001   
NatLevel     -0.06 -0.419  
LAW 0.42 1,746 * 0.599 2,106 ** $ $ $ 0.348 1.44  
ANTIDIR -0.113 -0.508 -0.158 -0.663  0.236 0.651  -0.155 -0.684  
Foreign1*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
-0.533 -1.33     
Foreign2*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
 -0.291 -1,055    
Foreign3*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
   -0.317 -0.403   
NatLevel*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
    -0.012 -0.07  
PolCon -0.001 -0.007 -0.038 -0.2  -0.334 -0.757  -0.007 -0.035  
Size 0.083 1,761 * 0.104 2,169 ** 0.134 1,262  0.08 1,674  
Profit 0.002 0.274 0.002 0.353  -0.012 -0.736  0.001 0.123  
Lev 0.031 0.092 0.037 0.112  -0.114 -0.15  0.017 0.05  
Capint -0.241 -1,244  -0.198 -1,039  0.069 0.157  -0.226 -1,177  
R2 0.067 0.071 0.195 0.064
Adj.-R2 0.056 0.06 0.134 0.054
F-Value           6,478 ***           6,894 ***           3,209 ***          6,187 ***
Model 3 - CTA Tipe 4
3A 3B 3C 3D
β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig. Β t-value Sig. β t-value Sig.
α 0.199 1,358  0.183 1,083  -0.058 -0.332  0.2 1,311  
CTAt-1 0.173 6,541 *** 0.174 6,575 *** 0.443 5,083 *** 0.173 6,545 ***
Foreign1 0.065 0.45     
Foreign2  0.017 0.158    
Foreign3   -0.045 -0.36   
NatLevel     -0.017 -0.294  
LAW 0.013 0.132 0.041 0.35 $ $ $ 0.048 0.482  
ANTIDIR -0.027 -0.293 -0.037 -0.374 -0.011 -0.153  -0.055 -0.586  
Foreign1*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
-0.007 -0.042     
Foreign2*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
 -0.033 -0.289    
Foreign3*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
  0.059 0.386   
NatLevel*LAW* 
ANTIDIR
    -0.027 -0.4  
PolCon 0.167 2,036 ** 0.151 1,902 * -0.026 -0.294  0.154 1,962 **
Size 0.022 1,151 0.024 1,222 0.039 1,875 * 0.025 1,286  
Profit -0.001 -0.334 -0.001 -0.194 -0.001 -0.475  0 -0.147  
Lev 0.078 0.569 0.079 0.571 -0.175 -1,177  0.07 0.509  
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Capint -0.421 -5,147 *** -0.408 -5,056 *** -0.112 -1,248  -0.402 -4,981 ***
R2 0.137 0.136 0.316 0. 138
Adj.-R2 0.127 0.127 0.265 0.129
F-Value 14,360 *** 14,311 *** 6,115 *** 14,524 ***
Note: ***, **, * is significant at 1%, 5%, 10% consecutively. $ is the LAW variable that is omitted and automatical-
ly deleted by the SPSS statistical program due to multicollinearity.
operating in countries with a high level of  
investor protection would have their high 
dividend payments affected. The companies 
would attempt to pay the dividend as long 
as they received a positive response from 
the markets (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). This 
study concluded that the investors in com-
panies that operate in countries with a high 
level of  investor protection feel secure and 
protected. Therefore, they have no problem 
with the tax avoidance issue as long as the 
company keeps paying them their dividends. 
This fact has caused the companies to be 
more aggressive in avoiding taxes in order 
to make the companies’ cash more flexible.
The Contingency of  the Legal Envi-
ronment
The testing scheme of  model 3 was 
similar to model 2. Table 7 summarises the 
result of  model 3. The result showed sig-
nificance in the CTA2 model of  sub-mod-
els 3A and 3C. The Foreign1 variable of  
sub-model 3A had a negative correlation 
and was significant at the level of  1%. Mean-
while, the Foreign3 variable of  sub-model 
3C had a negative correlation and was sig-
nificant at the level of  5%. The ANTIDIR 
variable had a negative correlation and was 
significant at the level of  1% in sub-model 
3C. The variables of  Foreign1*LAW*AN-
TIDIR and Foreign3*LAW*ANTIDIR had 
positive correlations and were significant at 
the level of  1%. The best model to predict 
the third hypothesis was the CTA2 model. 
The result indicates that the third hypoth-
esis was supported (Ha3 supported) by us-
ing the various models of  measurements.
The Polcon control variable had a pos-
itive correlation and was significant at the 
level of  1% in both sub-models. This result 
corresponds with the research done by Kim 
and Zhang (2016). The Leverage variable had 
a positive correlation and was significant in 
CTA2 model sub-model 3. Size, as a control 
variable, had a negative correlation and was 
significant at the level of  10% (sub-mod-
el 3A) and 5% (sub-model 3C). The Profit 
variable had a negative correlation and was 
significant at the level of  5%. Lastly, the vari-
able of  Capint had a negative correlation and 
was significant at the level of  1% in both 
sub-models. The findings for the control 
variables above were similar to the previous 
results explained in the findings for model 2.
Corporations which operate in common 
law countries gave their CEOs more oppor-
tunities to avoid taxes. The flexibility given to 
the CEOs allowed them to provide the pay-
ment and keep the profits for the investors as 
well as the findings from Alzahrani and Lasfer 
(2012), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), 
and La Porta et al., (2000b). This study sug-
gested that companies operating in common law 
countries with high levels of  investor protec-
tion pay higher dividends to their investors. 
The availability of  the protection makes the 
investors believe that the countries, as well 
as the companies, will not harm them. The 
investors’ sense of  security encourages the 
tax avoidance of  the companies. This study 
found that corporations which have strong 
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relationships with their foreign investors, 
while operating in common law countries that 
have a high level of  investor protection will 
be more aggressive in avoiding paying taxes.
Implications
First of  all, this study differentiated be-
tween national and multinational companies 
in their tax avoidance behaviour. Secondly, 
it investigated those firms’ behaviour, de-
pending upon how willing the country they 
operated in was to protect investors. It, then 
thirdly, investigated those firms’ behaviour 
depending on the legal system of  the coun-
try they operated in. Finally, it combined 
both the conditional factors that influenced 
the companies decisions to avoid paying tax. 
This study infers that if  the firms did avoid 
paying tax, it was because both the investors’ 
protection model and the law system ap-
plied by the country affected their decision. 
This study recommends a country to take 
economic policy. It means that the country 
should have to do whatever is necessary to 
bring greater prosperity to the nation. This 
study infers that two policies are needed to 
tune a country’s capital market. The first pol-
icy concerns protection for investors. When 
a country wants to attract foreign investors 
to trade in its funds, it should create a legal 
basis that offers them a great deal of  protec-
tion. The high level of  investor protection 
has consequences, since it gives the firms 
opportunities to manage their tax planning. 
It means that the firms could freely conduct 
tax avoidance schemes. From another per-
spective, a country has to establish its level 
of  investor protection through regulations. 
The second policy concerns the law 
system applied by a country. The firms feel 
that they would be more safe and could op-
erate in a more predictable manner in coun-
tries that have a common law system. This 
study infers that the firms could manipulate 
their accounting practices to determine their 
net accounting income due to the common 
law system. Nevertheless, the firms could 
not justify the accounting earnings caused 
by the rigidity of  the rules under code law. 
It means that the firms have fewer opportu-
nities to conduct tax planning. From another 
perspective, the countries that have adopted 
a code law system control all the firms op-
erating in their countries with a strict set of  
rules. Consequently the firms are unable to 
manage their net accounting income as well 
as tax planning efficiently and generously.
The third policy is the combination of  
investor protection and the legal system that a 
country could have. This study highlighted that 
most firms probably like to operate in coun-
tries with high investor protection and com-
mon law systems. In these countries, the firms 
can manage their accounting earnings and 
tax planning. In other words, the firms could 
apply the tax hypothesis that Watts and Zim-
merman (1978); (1990) suggested. The firms, 
then, could acquire greater benefits from their 
bonding with both local and foreign inves-
tors. Moreover, the countries could contract 
with the foreign investors to invest more of  
their funds so they create higher future poten-
tial cash inflows than countries that have low 
investor protection and the code law system. 
Finally, this study marked that it is two 
countries that are Singapore and Indonesia. 
Both countries have flags that are almost sim-
ilar. Singapore offers high levels of  protection 
for investors and uses the common law legal 
system. Meanwhile, Indonesia has low inves-
tor protection and its legal basis is in code law. 
Moreover, this study defines Singapore as a 
developed country and its capital market is ad-
vanced. Indonesia is still a developing country, 
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and its capital market is not yet an advanced 
one. This study concludes that these facts 
are what caused the differences. It, therefore, 
constructed the idea that a country has three 
tools to adjust the advancement of  its capital 
market and national prosperity, which are the 
level of  investor protection, the legal system 
and the combination of  them. What a coun-
try such as Indonesia could gain by following 
this idea is an increase in its gross domestic 
product, low unemployment, economic sta-
bility, a stronger currency and other benefits, 
because local and foreign investors would feel 
safe and thus increase their investment. This 
study argues that the rate of  tax avoidance be-
tween countries with common law and code 
law is nearly the same. It emphasises that tax 
avoidance is easier to do in countries with a 
common law system, where many compa-
nies would generaly choose to increase their 
invested capital in the legal environment. In 
other words, this study proposes that closely 
related to the company’s improved its liquid-
ity and growths opportunity. It means that 
the company’s decision to avoid tax in order 
to maintain its liquidity is considered to have 
a minimum risk compared to tax evasion.
Conclusion
There are two main objectives of  this 
study. First, this study examines the level of  
tax avoidance by multinational and nation-
al companies. Furthermore, it analyses the 
companies’ behaviour as the result of  dif-
ferences in the levels of  investor protection 
and the legal environment. By utilising four 
measurements of  tax avoidance, this study 
gains some empirical evidence. First, multi-
national companies are aggressive in avoid-
ing taxes compared to the national ones op-
erating in the same country. Internally, the 
importance of  foreign investors is reflected 
through foreign direct investment causing higher 
tax avoidance by the multinational companies.
Secondly, the high level of  investor pro-
tection in a country gives a sense of  securi-
ty to the investors. Multinational companies 
tend to be more aggressive in avoiding taxes 
if  they operate in a country with a high level 
of  investor protection. The strong bonding 
towards the investors causes the company to 
fulfil the investor’s needs by providing high 
dividend payments. Therefore, the company 
becomes more aggressive regarding its tax 
avoidance. If  foreign ownership is low, the 
company will not pay attention to its prof-
its and will protect its investors well. Third-
ly, based on the empirical evidence found, 
multinational companies operating in coun-
tries with a high level of  investor protec-
tion and the legal environment of  common 
law will tend to avoid taxes more frequent-
ly. The protection towards the investors will 
cause the companies’ management and CEOs 
to avoid taxes in order to keep profits up.
This research also contributes to the reg-
ulators in Indonesia. Indonesia somehow still 
applies a relatively non-permanent form of  
regulation; it is supposed to follow the tune. 
Indonesia has a low level of  investor protec-
tion and its legal system is based on code law. 
This results in tax allowances being offered 
and the opportunity for multinational com-
panies to accrue or to defer the tax due. The 
contribution of  this study for corporations is 
to consider the level of  investor protection. 
If  it is considered advantageous, a compa-
ny could relocate to a more helpful place. 
For academics, this research allows for oth-
er studies in the field of  taxation. This study 
offers the chance to develop future research. 
It should combine the measurements of  For-
eign1, Foreign2 and Foreign3 into a new one. 
Some measurements are worth considering as 
foreign ones, such as the existence of  debt.
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The findings of  this study do the upcom-
ing future research. First, the analysis used in 
this study did not consider the economic un-
certainty of  specific countries, and the next 
study might consider that. The next research 
would be better if  it considered differentiat-
ing between countries with high uncertainty 
in comparison to those with low uncertain-
ty. The second reason is that this study did 
not consider different legal tightness among 
countries. The result of  this study only takes 
two aspects into consideration: the level of  in-
vestor protection and the type of  law system. 
This study recommended that firms could 
do tax avoidance depending upon how each 
country applies its laws. Thirdly, the level of  
tax avoidance in this research did not consid-
er the different tax rates in the different coun-
tries; this can influence companies’ tax avoid-
ance decisions. It means that the measurement 
of  tax evidence is at the country level. The 
future research may seek to discover if  the 
level of  the tax rate in each country becomes 
a determinant factor. Finally, this new future 
study could induce press-media pressure 
and how it affects the firms’ tax avoidance.
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